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“There’s a time to be born, and a time to die; a time to break down, and a time to build up;
a time to weep, and a time to laugh; a time to keep silence, and a time to speak. . .” (Eccle-
siastes 3, 2–7). There was a time when automata were designed like clocks. Androids will
have the time of their creators, the state of the art in technology, a wealth of experience to
draw from, as well as the capacity to carry out actions as being endowed with meaning.
The machine will undergo a long period of nurturing, from which it will learn to shape some
sort of identity.
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MACHINES WILL LEAD US TO A NEW KIND OF HUMANISM
TO VINCENZO TAGLIASCO (1941–2008), PIONEER IN HUMANOID
ROBOTICS AND ARTIFICIAL COUNSCIOUSNESS STUDIES
Rosenblueth and Wiener (1945), in The Philosophy of Science
argued: “The best material model for a cat is another, or preferably
the same cat.”
Stanislaw Lem (1961) in Solaris, his science fiction novel, writes:
“We take off into the cosmos, ready for anything: for solitude, for
hardship, exhaustion, death. We do not want to conquer the cos-
mos, we simply want to extend the boundaries of Earth to the
frontiers of the cosmos. (. . .) We have no need of other worlds.
We need mirrors. We do not know what to do with other worlds.”
Summing up the two quotations, which involve a scientific and
science fiction approach, both Wiener’s “model” and Lem’s “mir-
ror” refer to the concepts of replica, mimesis, reconciliation, and
reduction of the same object or subject (Tagliasco, 1999).
The whole history of automata, which for the sake of conve-
nience we symbolically trace back to Heron of Alexandria with
his doves, had as its objective the attempt to reproduce and imi-
tate. The ancient Greeks conceived of the mythical ambivalent
Promethean will. On the one hand, this will push man to want to
imitate the creative capacity of the gods, as a pure act of will,
but also to exercise the power of a creator who retains con-
trol over his creatures. On the other hand, it entails the ability
to steal the tools of knowledge from the gods, that is, to know
how to create knowledge in order to facilitate survival, in build-
ing artifacts, including human simulacra, in order to empower
their tools to perform difficult tasks, as if they were mechanical
slaves.
According to Rinaldi (1981) in his introduction to the book of
J. Cohen “in the Greek world the machine had a magical character
since it opposes nature, it operates against nature and thus, given
that the mechanician, the engineer, the mekanopoiòs is a creator
of machines, he is, as a consequence, a wizard, a demon.”
In the Hellenistic period, an engineer is an ambiguous char-
acter, difficult to define; he does not care about theory, although
he understands geometry and mathematics; he neither operates
as an artisan nor as a technician. He is unable to place himself
between teknè and episteme since the radicality of the contra-
diction makes mediation impossible. He becomes a pivot in the
struggle with nature, which he forces, through his knowledge, to
produce wonders.
The rationale behind new technologies at the beginning of the
modern era does not lie in conceiving, inventing, and construct-
ing machines because of their utility or economic value: this only
happens later with the onset of the industrial revolution (Somenzi
and Cordeschi, 1986). The aim instead, lies in the realization that
nature could actually be controlled and dominated, that all pos-
sible machines could be built, that is, all machines that can be
conceived in line with the new physics, to ascertain the possibil-
ity of making something from every other thing. This challenge
reflects what Bergson (1907) says in his analysis of the natural
function of intelligence related to instinct: “Qu’il nous suffise de
dire que l’intelligence est caractérisée par la puissance indéfinie de
decomposer selon n’importe quelle loi et de recomposer en n’importe
quel sistème.”
The industrial society was a mass society with huge industrial
enterprises and gigantic civil services, standardized mass produc-
tion methods, and widespread conformism in the media and life
styles. In this society, utilities/economicity was the engineering
factor. Present information society is and will increasingly be a
society of individuals in which new technologies will cope with
the younger generation’s tendency to escape from a life of con-
formism and to express individuality. All this is occurring through
the emergence of a social and economic order based on decen-
tralized power and on the responsibility of the individual. On the
other hand, the role of the playful/magic engineering factor will
drive the construction of artifacts and machines (Florman, 1996).
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So the early development of a new technology very much
depends on the values recognized by leading social compo-
nents of the time. The self-perception of their own role as
operators involved in a technical invention also has an influ-
ence on the selection of the style and subject of the study
(White, 1987).
It is a fact that in old times, in the construction of automata
there was a magical intent, an alchemical influence, the desire for
creationist power. A clear view of science and the experimental
thrust of incremental technology afterward conditioned that story.
The endless production of objects of robotics descends from the
Promethean perspective: the act of creation, or more secularly the
act of creating, exhausts the action.
The story unfolds into the wonders of androids, such as Gemi-
noid F (Nishio et al., 2007), which recites Haikus on loneliness,
designed to “articulate feelings” given that it is conceived as being
a robot companion for the elderly. Laboratory practice is also not
lacking in the Promethean tradition of constructing automata, i.e.,
construction as hypothesis testing, but also the pleasure of being
able to amaze the public by exhibiting machines that know how to
do things on their own.
Question of why a humanoid should be built, and further-
more what drives the human beings to build a humanoid, leads to
question about how humanoids have to be built.
A careful analysis of the state of art suggests some directions
that the methods of construction will take (Lipson and Pollack,
2000; Pfeifer et al., 2007).
It is very interesting that scientific progress in all those disci-
plines that converge in robotics does not only pose a technological
paradigm shift, as discussed by Brooks (2002).
The construction of a humanoid, in some way, forces us to
revise the mythological origins of the underlying reasons that
drive a researcher to take part in a project. The development of
science and technology enabling the construction of humanoids,
has also helped to change the working practices of the builders
of humanoids in the course of epigenetic (Lungarella et al.,
2003) or developmental, individual growth (Floreano and Nolfi,
2000).
Genetic and evolutionary algorithms (Goldberg, 1989) have
provided tools to drive robot evolutionary, competitive develop-
ment (Nolfi et al., 1994).
However, if we attempt to adopt a hard biomimesis approach,
we would proceed along the lines set out by Parisi (1993).
A true characteristic of living systems resides in the emerging
nature of their behavior, which in itself prevents any prior deter-
ministic reasoning on the structures and function of the entity to
be generated.
In fact, as Parisi says: “A form of engineering truly inspired by
biology should aim to construct artifacts which, when left in the
hands of the engineer, are not yet what they should be, but will
become so after a process of development. Engineers no longer
create the artifact, they just create the conditions for an artifact to
develop and learn.”
What about these conditions? In the Promethean paradigm,
automata were designed like clocks. They repeated always the same
performance, even if they were and are very complex mechanisms.
Time was an external dimension.
As for human being, for a humanoid robot time should
become an internal dimension. Which conditions are necessary
for a humanoid to develop along a temporal line? How could a
humanoid realize a personal story, an individual capacity to define
a narrative line of its experiences? It is not just a question of soft-
ware engineering to be able to consider and analyze the time in
which the artifact lives. Like parents who try to understand how
to educate and teach to their offspring what it is essential in their
time, to interpret their personal experiences, social conditions,
and visions of the world. Engineers have to conceive means to
endow their creatures with the capacity to perform meaningful
and responsible actions (Marino and Tamburrini, 2006).
What about meaning? Meaning is what a human being is able
to recognize if an action is coherent with what others recognize
as pertinent and appropriate, within historical, social, scientific,
anthropological, mediatic contests. This is within relationships. It
could be seen as a tautology, but to implement a series of codes
leading to meaningful humanoid actions, unfolding in time, is the
greatest challenge for an engineer.
In fact, staying in the realm of the myth of Prometheus who cre-
ates human beings, molding them from mud and animating them
with divine fire, engineers create the artifact and mold the statue.
But their task does not end there. The engineer is first a builder,
then a “breeder of machines.” The focus shifts from an artificial
being that can demonstrate syllogistic reasoning, to the capacity
of this machine to learn and adapt. The creation of an artifact
capable of learning and changing behavior over time affects the
practice of an engineer in at least three ways: the personalization
of artifacts, their “breeding,” and their uniqueness.
Engineers, by being“breeders of machines,”extend the relation-
ship with their artifacts indefinitely, subjecting them to training,
by measuring the capacity of machines to learn and develop
autonomous behaviors, along a journey in which the ability of
the designer to nurture determines the possibility of “growth” of
the artifact.
An artifact that can learn and produce non-predefined behav-
ior, as an outcome of processes that fit together in non-
predetermined patterns dependent on the relationship with the
outside world, is thus a unique and unrepeatable artifact, much
closer to the artifacts of traditional craftsmanship or the work of
an artist.
The power of the Prometheus myth fades to make way for
another myth that seems better suited to explain this transition:
the myth of Pygmalion. The act of creation or construction of
the statue, whose beauty Pygmalion falls in love with, is not the
completion of the action. The metamorphosis of the statue, which
comes to life beginning to exhibit its nature, is not the result of the
act of creation, but the effort that Pygmalion implements in shap-
ing the characteristics that also make the statue a creative being.
The artifact is subjected to a process of care, attention, and educa-
tion, that becomes learned behavior; the metamorphosis produces
a creature, an individual. The attitude of the builder comes close
to a craftsperson who creates an object that will be unique and
absolutely irreproducible, as in the production of a work of art that
expresses its independence and uniqueness (Hofstadter, 2007).
Kelly (1994) says: “Yet as we unleash living forces into our cre-
ated machines, we lose control of them. They acquire wildness
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and some of the surprises that the wild entails. This, then, is the
dilemma all gods must accept: that they can no longer be com-
pletely sovereign over their finest creations. The world of the made
will soon be like the world of the born: autonomous, adaptable,
and creative but, consequently, out of our control.”
The fear of the loss of control also has ancient mythological
roots. It is very well-represented in the legend of the Golem and
then taken over by science fiction writers such as Isaac Asimov or
by the playwright Karel Capek, or more recently by Dick (1996)
with the rebel replicants of Blade Runner.
Regarding Kelly’s warning to all the gods that they can no longer
have total sovereignty over their creatures, which can escape from
our control due to their adaptability and creativity, the construc-
tion, and the breeding of a humanoid puts the engineer in a new
light. From the dialectics of the two categories of power and con-
trol, which have dominated and driven technology, starting from
the industrial revolution to the theory of servomechanisms of
Wiener (1948) from which recent history unravels, an engineer’s
focus shifts to the ability of the machine to evolve. A process of
waiting and wondering what the machine will be able to express
and what suggestions or hypotheses the machine itself will be able
to arouse in the observer, be it the technologist, scientist, or the
user of the machine itself. The machine’s performance will not be
assessed in terms of the purpose for which it was designed, but
on its level of autonomy. We could question as Goertzel (2013), in
commenting Kurzweil (2006) forecasts: “Will machines take con-
trol?” We do not endorse this view. Machines will undergo a long
and true processes of “care” from which they will learn to define
some sort of identity, responsibility, and ethics, with a symbiotic
liaison with the mentor, forced to operate accordingly on himself.
We do believe machines will lead us to a new kind of humanism.
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